CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT

-

FIRST AMEND-

MENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE CLOSURE OF ADULT BOOKSTORE
WHERE ILLEGAL ACTIVITY OCCURS ON PREMISES

-

Arcara v.

Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
The first amendment commands that freedom of speech may
not be abridged.' Although the amendment speaks in clarion
terms, its guarantees have never been treated as absolute by the
Supreme Court.2 As a result, commentators and judges have
made recurrent attempts to elucidate the true values served by
the first amendment and the state interests which warrant its infringement.3 The incidental abridgment of speech occasioned by
laws designed to serve nonspeech interests does not ordinarily
raise a first amendment issue.4 Recently, the United States
1 The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I., reprinted in L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw lxiii (1978). The
Supreme Court applied first amendment protection of freedom of expression to the
states through the fourteenth amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
2 One author has stated:
This absolutist position [regarding first amendment guarantees],
whereby any law which for any reason and in any degree punishes or
restricts speech is said to be unconstitutional, has never been accepted
by the Supreme Court, and, in fact, has been denied by the Court in a
long series of opinions, both those which upheld the free speech claim,
and those which denied it.
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.01, at 2-3 (1984). The following
cases have upheld freedom of speech claims: Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931). For cases in which the Supreme Court has denied free speech
claims, see e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584 (1942); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
3 See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 9 (1984). Additionally, the Supreme Court in a series of recent decisions has delineated the
boundaries for determining the extent to which the government may constitutionally regulate protected speech. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (198 1); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452
U.S. 61 (1981).
4 See TRIBE, supra note 1, §§ 12-2, -3, at 580-88. See also Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961). Infringement of speech
may be divided into two categories--one based on the content of the speech and
the other based on an incidental intrusion. See Case Comments, Relevance of Improper Motive to FirstAmendment Incidental Infringement Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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Supreme Court addressed this unique circumstance in Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc.5 The Arcara Court held that illegal sexual conduct is not entitled to first amendment protection simply because
such activity occurred in a bookstore selling constitutionally protected material.6
Cloud Books, Inc. (Cloud Books) operated the Village Books
and News Store (Village Books) in Kenmore, New York.7 Cloud
Books described itself as an adult bookstore specializing in the
sale of books, magazines, and novelties of a sexually frank nature.' In addition, coin-operated booths were available on the
premises for viewing sexually explicit movies. 9
In September 1982, the Erie County District Attorney commenced an investigation concerning alleged illegal activities occurring on the premises of Village Books.' 0 An undercover
police officer visited the bookstore on various occasions for a period of approximately three weeks and witnessed patrons of the
store engaged in lewd and illegal conduct. ' Specifically, the officer claimed to have personally observed instances of fondling,
fellatio, and masturbation all within the plain view of the proprietor. 12 The policeman reported that periodically patrons were exposed to solicitation of prostitution and, in fact, was himself
solicited to engage in sexual acts for renumeration on at least
four separate occasions. 1 3 The officer asserted that the management of Village Books knew of the sexual activity taking place on
272, 277 (1986). One commentator noted that the "incidental impact [on speech]
can occur when the government directs its actions at the noncommunicative elements of a particular activity." Id. at 279.
5 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
6 Id. at 3178.
7 Id. at 3173. Charles Ottaviano, owner of the premises, was also named as a
defendant in the action. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 101 A.D.2d
163, 164 n.I, 475 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 n.1 (1984), rev'd, 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E. 2d
1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 106 S.Ct. 3172 (1986). This case,
however, concerns only the activities of Cloud Books, Inc., and any use of "respondent" refers exclusively to the establishment.
8 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3173.
9 Id.
10 Id.
' IId.
12

Id.

13 Id. Cloud Books denied both the occurrence of such acts on its premises and

its knowledge thereof. People ex. rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 119 Misc. 2d 505, 506,
465 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (Sup. Ct. 1983), aff'd, 101 A.D.2d 163, 475 N.Y.S.2d 173
(1984), rev'd, 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1985),
rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
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the premises. 14

Subsequently, the District Attorney filed a civil complaint
against Cloud Books seeking to close the store. 5 The state
charged that the operation of Village Books constituted a nuisance in violation of the New York Public Health Laws. 16 Cloud
Books moved for partial summary judgment 17 asserting that the
statute was inapplicable to bookstores 1 8 and further contended
that closure of the premises would impermissibly interfere with
14 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3173. In an affidavit relating his observations, the officer
alleged that he brought this behavior to the attention of the store employees but
was informed that they were not concerned with such activity as long as the patrons
involved were spending money in the store. Arcara, 65 N.Y. 2d at 326, 480 N.E.2d
at 1091-92, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
15 The complaint also requested a preliminary injunction, but this relief was denied by both the trial court and the appellate division. Arcara, 65 N.Y. 2d at 327
n.2, 480 N.E.2d at 1092 n.2, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 310 n.2.
16 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3174. The action was brought under Title 2 of Article 23
of the New York Public Health Laws. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3173-74. Under § 2321,
the district attorney is authorized to institute an action enforcing the Article's provisions. Id. at 3174. Section 2320 of the New York Public Health Law characterizes
"places of prostitution, lewdness, and assignation as public health nuisances:"
1. Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own, or lease
any building, erection, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is guilty of maintaining a nuisance.
2. The building, erection, or place, or the ground itself, in or upon
which any lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted, or carried on, continued, or exists, and the furniture, fixtures, musical instruments, and movable property used in conducting or
maintaining such nuisance, are hereby declared to be a nuisance and
shall be enjoined and abated as hereafter provided.
Id. (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2320 (McKinney 1985)). In addition, § 2329
provides for the closure of any building found to be a public health nuisance under
§ 2320, and states:
1. If the existence of the nuisance be admitted or established in an action as provided in this article, or in a criminal proceeding in any court,
an order of abatement shall be entered as part of the judgment in the
case. . . and shall direct the effectual closing of any building, erection
or place against its use for any purpose, and so keeping it closed for a
period of one year. ...
Id. (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2329 (McKinney 1985)).
17 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3174. The complaint consisted of two counts, the first of
which alleged a common law nuisance. Arcara, 65 N.Y.2d at 327, 480 N.E.2d at
1092, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The trial court dismissed this count, and thus it was not
at issue on appeal. Id.
18 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3174. The argument advanced by Cloud Books was that
the statute was inapplicable to the store because it was directed only at houses of
prostitution as the term is generally understood. Arcara, 101 A.D. 2d at 166, 475
N.Y.S. 2d at 176. The appellate court, however, rejected this argument noting that
"[i]f the statute were intended to apply exclusively to houses of prostitution,
• . .the Legislature would [not] have given such a broad definition to the term 'nuisance.' " Id., 475 N.Y.S.2d at 176-77.
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their first amendment right of free speech. 9
The trial division of the New York Supreme Court denied
the motion for summary judgment and held that the statute was
applicable to Cloud Books.2" The court also rejected Cloud
Books' constitutional claim, reasoning that the closure order did
not involve a prior restraint warranting the protection of the first
amendment. 21 Further, the court maintained that an adult book
store should not be permitted to invoke constitutional rights and
22
protections to shield illegal activity.
The appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision and
expressly adopted the rationale espoused by the lower court.25
Additionally, the court granted Cloud Books' application for
leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.24 On appeal,
New York's highest court determined that the scope of the New
York statute was intended to reach establishments other than
houses of prostitution.2 5 The court, however, reversed the lower
courts' holding on first amendment grounds, 26 reasoning that
closure of the bookstore would entail an unconstitutional restraint on the right of the store and its patrons to disseminate
and purchase expressive material.27
The state filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the de19 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3174.
Arcara, 119 Misc. 2d at 514, 465 N.Y.S. 2d at 639. The trial court determined
that the New York Public Health Laws are applicable to enjoin a nuisance occurring
on premises other than a house of prostitution if there is a factual finding that a
pattern of use including lewdness, assignation, or prostitution exists. Id. at 510-11,
465 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
21 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3174.
22 Id.
23 Arcara, 101 A.D. 2d at 172-74, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 180-81.
24 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3174. The motion was granted with respect to both questions-whether the statute encompassed establishments other than traditional
houses of prostitution and the first amendment claim. Id.
25 Arcara, 65 N.Y. 2d at 329-31, 480 N.E. 2d at 1093-95, 491 N.Y.S. 2d at 311-13.
Courts in other states have applied their nuisance statute to places which were not
"traditional" houses of prostitution. See, e.g., People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. American Art Enters., Inc., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 142 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1977) (applied to
book publisher's building); State ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Levenburg, 406 Mich. 455, 280 N.W.2d 810 (1979) (applied to bar).
26 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3174.
27 Id. The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that an order closing a bookstore or movie theatre because of distribution of obscene materials at the premises
was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Arcara, 65 N.Y.2d at 332, 480 N.E.2d at
1095, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 313. See, e.g., Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. City of Miami, 719
F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1983); General Corp. v. Alabama ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657,
320 So.2d 688 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P. 2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied
sub nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theater, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
20
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cision of the New York Court of Appeals.2" The United States
Supreme Court granted the writ 9 and reversed the New York
Court of Appeals' decision."0 Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, determined that the first amendment does not preclude closure of an adult bookstore when illegal activities have
taken place on the premises.'
The first amendment prohibits the government from taking
any action which unduly infringes the exercise of free speech.32
Within the meaning of the Constitution, speech encompasses
both verbal and nonverbal communications. 33 It is well established, however, that all forms of speech are not protected by the
first amendment 3 and that certain forms of "symbolic speech"
28 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986)
(No. 85-437).
29 Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 379 (1985). The decision of the New
York Court of Appeals conflicted with decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court and
the Pennsylvania Superior Court which both upheld the closure of bookstores
under public health nuisance statutes based on illicit sexual activities occurring on
the premises. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Allouwill Realty Corp., 330 Pa.
Super. 32, 478 A. 2d 1334 (1984); Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 228 Va.
383, 323 S.E. 2d 86 (1984).
30 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3178.
31 Id.
32 See supra note 1 (text of first amendment).
33 The notion that speech may be nonverbal was recognized by the Supreme
Court as early as 1931 in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). There the
Court declared invalid a state statute, which prohibited the display of a red flag as a
symbol of opposition to organized government, as an impermissible abridgment of
freedom of speech. Id. at 361, 369-70. The Supreme Court subsequently applied
first amendment analysis to nonverbal communications. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (nude dancing entitled to first amendmrent protection); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) ("a [campaign] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views");
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (peace symbol affixed to flag held protected speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (student wearing of black armbands to protest Vietnam War protected
under first amendment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (first
amendment "rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action" [as in the instant case, a silent sit-in in a public library]); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (flag salute held to
be a "form of utterance"); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing held
protected by first amendment).
34 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Supreme Court
noted that certain types of speech are not worthy of constitutional protection because they are not an "essential part of any exposition of ideas." Id. at 572. If the
Supreme Court determines that certain speech falls within its definitions of obscenity, child pornography, fighting words, or advocacy of violence, a governmental
regulation of the speech will be sustained if the regulation constitutes a rational
means of pursuing a rational goal. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756, 76465 (1982) (child pornography); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 53-55
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may be constitutionally regulated.3 5
In 1968, the Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Brien, 36 articulated what has remained a viable and fundamental test for determining the extent of first amendment protection afforded
symbolic speech.3 7 In that case, David O'Brien publicly burned
his draft card on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse in
protest of the Vietnam War.3 8 Subsequently, he was convicted of
violating the federal draft laws. 9 O'Brien argued that the draft
law provisions were unconstitutional as applied to him because
they restricted his freedom of expression.4 °
In rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court noted that
not all forms of conduct may be labelled as "speech" simply because the actor intends to express an idea.4 ' The O'Brien Court
reasoned that even when conduct manifests a communicative element sufficient to invoke first amendment guarantees, full protection is not automatic. 4 2 Rather, the Court recognized that "when
(1973) (obscenity); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (obscenity);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-23 (1972) (fighting words); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (advocacy of violence); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting words).
35 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900
(1968).
36 Id.
37 See M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 3.06 [D] at 3-47.
38 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. The registration certificate which O'Brien burned
listed his name, age, selective service number, physical description, and the local
registration board's address. Id. at 373. The notice of classification listed
O'Brien's name, selective service number, and his current classification. Id. at 37375. See 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962) (requiring possession of registration certificate);
32 C.F.R. § 1623.5 (1962) (requiring possession of notice of classification).
39 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 370. The indictment upon which O'Brien was tried
charged that he " 'willfully and knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by
burning . . .[his] Registration Certificate (Selective Service Systems Form No. 2)
in violation of Title 50, App. United States Code, Section 462 (b).' " Id. (citations
omitted). As amended by Congress in 1965, § 462(b) made it an offense for any
person who "forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates .
or
changes any such certificate in any manner. Id.
40 Id. Although O'Brien's actions lacked a verbal element, free speech protections have never been predicated upon symbolic conduct related to that verbal expression. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (sit-in). Moreover,
symbolic communication has never been limited to acts traditionally associated with
speech. Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (allowing sit-in demonstration); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (allowing protest march);
with Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (disallowing peaceful picketing).
41 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
42 Id. The Court is required to balance the free speech interest against "the
magnitude of the public interests which . . .[the statute is] designed to protect"
and "the pertinence ... [it bears] to the protection of those interests." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 93 (1961). See Cox v.
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speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest
justify incidental limitain regulating the nonspeech element can
43
tions on First Amendment freedoms.

Proceeding with its analysis in light of these considerations,
ChiefJustice Warren enunciated a four-part test for determining
when a governmental interest justifies regulation of expressive
conduct.4 4 According to the O'Brien Court, such a regulation will
be upheld (1) if it falls within the constitutional power of government; (2) if the regulation advances "an important or substantial
governmental interest;" (3) if that governmental interest is not
related to a restraint of free expression; and (4) "if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 45 The Court
found that all of these requirements were satisfied4 6 and thus
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (breach of peace conviction not justified simply because violation was possible); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (witness refusing to answer question relating to Communist Party affiliations held in
contempt because of important government interest); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (compulsory disclosure of membership lists subject to closest scrutiny
because may curtail freedom of association).
43 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
44 Id. at 377.
45 Id. In characterizing the importance of the governmental interest which must
be evident, the Supreme Court has defined the following descriptive terms related
to the O'Brien test: "compelling" (NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)), "substantial" (NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958)), "subordinating" (Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)), "paramount" (Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)), "cogent" (Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960)) and "strong" (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963)).
The O'Brien test has been limited to governmental action aimed at regulating
the noncommunicative elements of an activity as evidenced by the Court's refusal
to apply the test to governmental action regulating communicative aspects of conduct. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking down governmental
attempts to limit political contributions and expenditures as violative of first
amendment protection of speech).
46 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The 1965 Amendment of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act met the first part of the O'Brien test because the government has constitutional power "to raise and support armies and to make all laws
necessary and proper to that end...." Id. The Court also determined that part
two of the test was satisfied because the Selective Service certificate served purposes beyond notification. Id. at 377-78. These purposes included quick induction
in time of national crisis, facilitation of communication between registrants and
draft boards, delinquency in service obligations, changes in an individual's status,
and deterrence for deceptive use of certificates. Id. at 378-79. Part three of the
test was satisfied because governmental interests were directed at the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct. Id. at 381-82. Finally, the Court concluded that the 1965 Amendment was limited to insure smooth administrative
functioning of the Selective Service System. Id. at 382.
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concluded that the governmental interest at stake, namely the efficient administration of the selective service system, was sufficiently important and substantial to override O'Brien's first
amendment rights.4 7
One year later, the Supreme Court decided Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,4" which involved a
similar form of expressive conduct.49 In Tinker, several high
school students were suspended for violating a school policy
which forbade the wearing of armbands while at school.5 ° The
policy had been adopted by the local school district in anticipation of student protest of the Vietnam War. 5 ' Subsequently, the
students, through their parents, brought an action seeking to enjoin the school officials from disciplining the students.52 The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the school
district's policy was a reasonable means of preventing disruption
in the classrooms.5" The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed.

54

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.55 In reaching its
decision, the Court characterized the wearing of the armbands as
an action which involved "direct, primary First Amendment
rights," which enabled the petitioners to invoke the provision's
safeguards.5 6 The Court further observed that the school policy,
which forbade the display of the armbands, failed the third part
of the O'Brien test because the regulation was directly related to
the suppression of free speech.57 Justice Fortas, writing for the
majority, distinguished the school district's policy from the statute involved in O'Brien. Justice Fortas posited that the O'Brien
statute prohibited the burning of all draft cards, whereas the
47 Id. at 382. The O'Brien decision has been criticized by commentators for its
failure to dispose of O'Brien's actions by a more traditional first amendment balancing of speech and nonspeech interests. See Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10-11. Specifically, it has
been stated that the Court should have dealt in greater detail with the constitutional impact of the speech element in O'Brien's conduct instead of the statute's
non-regulatory aspects. Id. at 17-18.
48 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
49 Id. at 504.

50
5'

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 504-05.

Id.

Id.
affirmed
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
54

at 505. Due to a divided Eighth Circuit, the lower court's decision was
without opinion. Id.
at 514.
at 508.
at 510-11.
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school district's policy in Tinker proscribed only the display of
black armbands, but permitted the wearing of other symbolic apparel.5 8 Consequently, the Court applied a general first amendment standard of review 59 to the ordinance at issue and
concluded that the school district's attempt to single out a particular symbolic activity constituted a suppression of the student's
right to free expression. 60 Hence, the student's right to wear the
armbands was upheld. 6 '
In 1974, the Supreme Court further elaborated the O'Brien
test in Spence v. Washington.62 In that case, the Court determined
that an individual's alteration of a United States flag, in certain
instances, constituted protected expression under the first
amendment.6 3 Spence had attached peace symbols to an American flag which he displayed upside down outside his window 64 in
65

protest of the Cambodian invasion and the Kent State killings.
He was convicted under the state's "improper use" statute which
prohibited placing a figure, design, or mark on a United States

58 Id. The school did not attempt to ban all symbols of political or controversial
significance. Id. Some students wore political campaign buttons and others displayed the Iron Cross, the traditional symbol of Nazism. The regulation did not
apply to these symbols. Id. at 510.
59 When the government regulates the noncommunicative aspect of an act and
that regulation is challenged, courts invoke a balancing test which weighs an individual's free speech interest against the government's interest in the regulation. L.
TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-2, at 582. In Tinker, the Court determined that failure to
satisfy the third prong of the O'Brien test caused the regulation to be analyzed
under the strict balancing test. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11. Thus, the Court balanced the student's first amendment rights against those of the school authorities.
See id. at 509.
60 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. The Court, in balancing the student's exercise of first
amendment rights against the prohibition of wearing armbands, stated that such
conduct could not be prohibited unless it " 'materially and substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.' " Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 514. The Tinker Court refused to consider the constitutionality of
school regulations dealing with hair or skirt length, or other aspects of personal
appearance which might be forms of symbolic expression. Id. at 507-08. See generally, Recent Cases, Prohibition of Long HairAbsent Showing of Actual Disruption Violates
High School Student's Constitutional Rights, Breen v. Kahl; Requirement That High School
Students Shave Is Valid if Founded on a Rational Basis, Stevenson v. Board of Education,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1702 (1971) (discussing whether certain aspects of personal appearance are symbolic speech entitled to first amendment protection).
62 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
63 Id. at 406.
64 Id. The flag was displayed on a privately-owned building in Seattle, Washington. Id.
65 Id. at 408. The appellant claimed that his purpose in displaying the flag in
this manner "was to associate the American flag with peace instead of war and violence." Id.
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flag or exposing any such flag to view. 6 6
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction reasoning that
the defendant had engaged in an expressive activity worthy of
constitutional protection.6 7 The Court opined that the presence
of a first amendment interest called for application of the O'Brien
test, requiring a determination whether the governmental interest in curtailing protected activity was adequately justified.6 8 Unlike the O'Brien Court, however, the Spence Court considered not
only the nature of the defendant's activity, but also the "factual
context and environment in which it was undertaken. '6 9 The
employment of these considerations by the Court represented a
departure from the unqualified assumptions delineated in
O'Brien.7 ° Moreover, the Court shifted from the speech/content
distinction relied upon in O'Brien and invoked a balancing test
which weighed the individual's first amendment interests against
those of the government. 7 ' The Spence majority conceded that
the governmental interest involved, namely, "preserving the
physical integrity of a privately owned flag," was not substantial
enough to support the conviction.7 2
66 Id. at 407. The defendant was convicted under an improper use statute which
provided in pertinent part:
No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display:
(1) Place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color,
ensign or shield of the United States or of this state . . .or
(2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield
upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or
to which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any
such word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement....
Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9.86.020 (1977)).
It is interesting to note that Spence was not found guilty under Washington's flag
desecration statute. Id. at 406; see also id. at 406-07 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.86.030 (1977)).
67 Id. at 415. The Court determined that the defendant engaged in a form of
communication using his own flag on private property and, more importantly, the
record was devoid of evidence regarding a risk of a breach of the peace. Id. at 40809.
68 Id. at 409.
69 Id. at 410. In relating the defendant's activity to the Cambodian invasion and
the Kent State killings, the communicative component of the peace symbol attached
to the flag was better understood. Id. The Court recognized that this was not an
act of anarchy by the appellant but an expression of actual concern about current
government affairs. Id. at 410-11.
70 See id. In O'Brien, the Court did not consider the communicative nature of the
draft card burning or defendant's motivation behind its destruction. O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 381-82.
71 Spence, 418 U.S. at 414-15.
72 Id. at 415.
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has continued to apply
the orthodox O'Brien test to cases involving governmental regulation of conduct which manifests an expressive element. 73 In
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,74 for example, the
Supreme Court held that symbolic speech is not absolutely protected under the first amendment. 75 Clark involved a round-theclock demonstration by members of a concerned religious group
to dramatize the plight of the homeless. 76 The demonstrators
obtained a permit from the National Park Service in Washington,
D.C., which allowed the group's "sleeping demonstration" to be
conducted in all but certain temporary structures on the park's
grounds. 7 7 The Park Service based the restrictions on the premise that sleeping in the non-designated areas would violate the
park's revised "anti-camping" regulations. 78
The demonstrators alleged that the regulations stifled their
first amendment guarantees by frustrating their use of symbolic
speech. 79 The Supreme Court found that the sleeping activity, in
connection with the demonstration, constituted symbolic expression; therefore, the constitutionality of the park regulations was
subject to review under the O'Brien test.80 The Court refused to
invalidate the regulations simply because less burdensome alter73 See Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3176-77.
74 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
75 Id. at 289, 299.

76 Id. at 291-92. The demonstration's purpose "was to impress upon the Reagan Administration, the Congress, and the public the plight of the poor and the
homeless." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 587
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc) (plurality opinion), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
77 Clark, 468 U.S. at 291-92. The National Park Service issued a renewable
seven-day permit to conduct a continuous demonstration in Washington, D.C.
Clark, 468 U.S. at 291-92. The permit allowed the erection of two "symbolic campsites" - one in Lafayette Park across from the White House and the other on the
Mall near the Washington Monument. Id.
78 Id. at 290. The revised regulations permit camping, defined in part as "the
use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities,"
only in designated campgrounds. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1983)). The
park, in this case, contained no such designated areas. Id. These regulations, however, do permit the construction of temporary structures "for the purpose of symbolizing a message or meeting logistical needs" as long as these structures are not
used "for living accommodation activities such as sleeping." Id. at 291 n.2 (quoting
36 C.F.R. § 50.19(e)(8)). Thus, the Park Service permit allowed the demonstrators
to erect their symbolic tents, but prohibited them from actually sleeping in them.
See Community for Creative Non-Violence, 703 F.2d at 587.
79 Clark, 468 U.S. at 292.
80 Id. at 293. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the activity of the demonstrators constituted symbolic expression. See id. The Court, citing Spence and
Tinker, recognized that an individual may profess an idea by acting in a manner
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natives might be available."' Rather, the Clark majority opined
that the incidental burden on speech was no greater than essential, and therefore, permissible under the O'Brien test. 2 Proceeding in light of these considerations, the Supreme Court held that
there was a substantial governmental interest in maintaining the
parks in the heart of our nation's capital.83
Most recently, the Supreme Court examined the basic tenets
of O'Brien and its progeny in United States v. Albertini. 4 In Albertini,
the Court examined a military statute making unlawful the attempt to reenter a military base subsequent to having been
barred from the base.8 5 The defendant, James Albertini, received a letter in 1972 from a Hawaiian airforce base barring him
from reentering the base without governmental permission. 6
Albertini was sent this letter because of his previous misconduct
concerning the destruction of government documents 7 and his
subsequent conviction for conspiring to destroy government
property.8 8
Nearly ten years later, in 1981, Albertini reentered the base
in order to engage in a peaceful demonstration criticizing the nuclear arms race.8 ' Albertini and four friends passed out leaflets
intended and understood by others viewing such conduct as a form of communication. Id. at 294.
81 Id. at 295.
82 Id. at 294.
83 Id. at 295. In dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan were unconvinced that
any substantial governmental interest was advanced by the Park Service's restrictions. Id. at 311-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
85 Id. at 677. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1984). The statute at issue provides:
Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, goes upon any
military, naval or Coast Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or unlawful regulation; or Whoever reenters or is found within any such reservation,
post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in
command or charge thereof-Shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id.
86 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 677.
87 Id. In 1972, Albertini and a companion improperly entered Hickam Air Force
Base in Hawaii and defaced government documents by pouring animal blood on
them. Id. Subsequent to this illegal activity, Albertini received letters barring him
from various Hawaiian military bases. Id. at 678.
88 Id. at 677.
Albertini was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1361.
Albertini, 472 U.S. at 677.
89 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 678. Albertini entered Hickam Air Force Base again during an open house for the 32nd Annual Armed Forces Day. Id.
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and displayed a banner. 90 The group, although they did not disrupt the activities of the open house, were escorted off the base
and Albertini was convicted of trespass. 9 ' Albertini charged that
his conviction should be set aside because, among other things,
his conduct at the base was protected under the first amendment. 9 2 In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court recognized that the expressive nature of the defendant's conduct was
subject to governmental regulation. 93 In applying the O'Brien
test, the Court maintained that the statute was content-neutral
and did not violate Albertini's first amendment liberties because
it was merely a time, place, and manner regulation.9 4 Further,
the majority reiterated the reasoning espoused by the Clark Court
that "such regulations [are not] invalid simply because there is
some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech." 9 5 Under this rationale, the Court concluded that the
government's interest in assuring the security of its military installations was sufficient to justify an incidental burden on
speech.96
It was against the historical application of O'Brien that the
case of Arcara v. Cloud Books was decided. In Arcara, the United
States Supreme Court expressly rejected the O'Brien test as a
standard for evaluating conduct which does not manifest an element of protected expression.9 7 ChiefJustice Burger, writing for
the majority, began his opinion by noting that the purpose of the
O'Brien test was to protect against unwarranted governmental
regulation of conduct which contains an expressive element. 98
The Chief Justice then recognized that the Supreme Court has
consistently applied O'Brien to situations in which the government directed its regulation at conduct as opposed to conduct
coupled with protected speech. 9 9 The Court thereafter reiter90 Id. The banner which was placed in front of a B-52 Bomber read "Carnival of
Death." Id.
91 Id. at 679.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 682-84.
94 Id. at 688-89. In determining the extent of the substantial government interest delineated by the statute, the Court posited that nothing in the first amendment
requires military personnel to wait until persons subject to a valid bar order have
entered the base to see whether they will conduct themselves in a proper manner.
Id. Cf Perry Educ. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 52 n.12 (1983).
95 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689.
96 Id.
97 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3175-77.
98 Id. at 3176.
99 Id.
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ated that first amendment analysis may be employed to analyze a
statute which may have the incidental effect of burdening
speech.'0 0 The Court noted that it was willing to apply first
amendment scrutiny to statutes that, although directed at noncommunicative activity,0 disproportionately burden protected first
amendment activities. 1 1
Chief Justice Burger pointed out that Arcara was not a case
which involved protected expression. 0 2 Thus, he disagreed with
the results obtained by the New York Court of Appeals in its application of the O'Brien test to illicit sexual activity. 10 3 The Chief
Justice reasoned that the symbolic draft card burning in O'Brien
possessed, at the very least, a semblance of expressive activity
whereas the public display of illicit sexual conduct enjoys no first
amendment safeguards.' 0 4
Addressing the constitutionality of the New York statute,
Chief Justice Burger asserted that the provision was tailored to
serve an important governmental interest: the health of the community. 0 5 According to the Court, such an interest is unrelated
to the suppression of speech and is independent of any desire to
suppress speech.'0 6 Chief Justice Burger emphatically rejected
Cloud Books' contention that the effects of the statutory closure
100 Id. at 3175-76.
101 Id. at 3177 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)). The Minneapolis Star case involved a challenge to a
Minnesota statute which imposed a use tax on the cost of paper and ink consumed
during the production of newspapers and other periodic publications. Minneapolis
Star, 460 U.S. at 577. While the Court recognized that the raising of revenue is a
legitimate state interest, it determined that the effects of the statute imposed a disproportionate burden on the newspaper industry due to their substantial consumption of ink and paper. Id. at 586-88. The Court found that enactment of such a
statute created an unconstitutional burden on the press. Id. at 591-92. The Court
stated that the "[d]ifferential taxation of the press ... places such a burden on the
interests protected by the First Amendment [which cannot be tolerated] unless the
State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot
achieve without differential taxation." Id. at 585.
102 Arcara, 106 S.Ct. at 3176-77 (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 67 (1973)). The Chief Justice noted that Paris underscored the fallacy of attempting to invoke first amendment protections to unlawful sexual activity by "attributing protected expressive attributes to that conduct." Id. at 3177.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 3175.
105 Id. at 3177.
106 Id. The ChiefJustice stated that if the city invoked closure penalties for health
hazards, such as inadequate sewage system or fire code violations, the first amendment would not protect the owner of the premises if he caused such violations to
continue. Id.
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remedy substantially curtailed protected bookselling activity. 10 7
The majority reasoned that this argument was tenuous because
Cloud Books was free to continue the legitimate aspect of its
business at a different location.'0 8 Moreover, the Chief Justice
observed that, although it may be inconvenient to relocate the
bookstore, the Court was not bound to the "least restrictive
means" of scrutiny.' 09 The majority further noted that the only
circumstances which warrant application of such scrutiny occur
when the conduct in question possesses a "significant expressive
element that [draws] the legal remedy in the first place, as in
O'Brien, or where a statute based on a nonexpressive activity has
the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive
activity.

,,11

Finally, the majority stated that otherwise illicit

conduct could not be cloaked in legality by the mere presence of
a first amendment protected activity such as bookselling. 111
Thus, Chief Justice Burger concluded that the first amendment
does not preclude the closure of a bookstore where illegal activity takes place on its premises. 112
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion, concurring in
the Court's judgment.' 1 3 Although she agreed with the majority
that the application of a first amendment standard of review was
without merit when the subject of the governmental regulation
did not involve speech or an incidental effect on speech," 4 Justice O'Connor emphasized that if Cloud Books established that
the city invoked the nuisance statute merely as a pretext for closing down an "undesirable" bookstore, such action would be impermissible." 5 Justice O'Connor pointed out, however, that the
bookstore in Arcara failed to assert that closure of its premises
was in any way motivated by a desire to suppress protected
speech.1 6 Therefore, the justice agreed with the Court's conclu107 Id.
1o8 Id.
109 Id.

See generally J.

NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA, J.

YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,

§ 16.10 at 848 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining least restrictive means test).
110 Arcara, 106 S.Ct. at 3177-78.
111 Id. at 3178.
112

Id.

113 Id. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114 Id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that any other conclusion would result in an
automatic application of first amendment analysis whenever government action
could be traced to some speech-inhibiting circumstances. Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. Justice O'Connor stated that "[w]ere respondents (Cloud Books) able to
establish the existence of such a speech suppressive motivation or policy on the
part of the District Attorney, they might have a claim of selective prosecution." Id.
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i7
sion that a first amendment argument was misplaced."
In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun disagreed
with the majority's rejection of a first amendment standard of review to the facts at bar." 8 He explained that the first amendment's protections extend to all laws "abridging the freedom of
speech," not just those aimed at conduct with a communicative
element." 9 This conclusion, he implied, was supported by both
the
text
of
the
amendment
and
Supreme
Court
20
interpretations.
Noting the Court's previous acknowledgment that the challenged statute " 'must be tested by its operation and effect,' 1,,21
the dissent maintained that the results of such examination
should be scrutinized by the courts. 1 22 Specifically, the Justice
contended that when a statute abridges first amendment freedoms, it must be duly justified. 2 3 Supporting his position that a
challenged statute which attempts to regulate nonspeech should
be declared invalid if it is found to infringe protected speech, Jus-

n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524
(1985)).
In Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the government sought restrictions
on the basis of an advance determination of expressive materials. Id. at 703. In this
classic case articulating the heavy presumption against prior restraints, the Court
struck down a state procedure which closed, as a public nuisance, a newspaper
which criticized local officials. Id. at 722-23. See also City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986) (city ordinance prohibiting adult movie theatres from locating within 1000 feet of certain property held constitutional because
ordinance was predominately aimed at secondary effects of adult uses and not its
content); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (order restraining
media from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions, admissions, or
other facts implicating accused); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 426 U.S. 50
(1976) (upholding zoning ordinance requiring theatres specializing in "adult movies" and "adult bookstores" be geographically dispersed on grounds that total ban
on sexually explicit materials did not occur); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (order enjoining publication of Pentagon Papers); Bantam
Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (invalidating administrative book review
procedure which identified "objectionable" books and effectively prevented their
continued publication and circulation).
117 Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was joined in dissent by justices Brennan and Marshall. Id.
119 Id. at 3178-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120 See id. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The language of the first amendment speaks in absolute terms, allowing no exceptions. See Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245. Certain Supreme Court decisions
have held the amendment's language to be absolute. See, e.g., supra note 2.
121 Arcara, 106 S.Ct. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931)).
122 Id.
123 Id.
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tice Blackmun relied on earlier Supreme Court decisions. 1 24 Accordingly, he posited that the state's interest in regulating an
activity must be balanced
against the imposition placed on the
25
fundamental right. 1
Justice Blackmun noted that the state has a legitimate interest in curtailing public sexual activity. 12 6 Yet, the dissent maintained that, when a first amendment activity is substantially
impaired, the state should be required to prove that it has employed the "least restrictive means" of attaining its legitimate
objectives.' 2 7 The Justice opined that the one year closure penalty in Arcara presented a substantial infringement on Cloud
Books' first amendment rights. 12 8 Justice Blackmun commented
that while the bookstore was permitted to continue its bookselling activity at an alternate site, local zoning laws might disallow
such an option, effectively stifling protected first amendment interests. 1 29 The Justice strongly criticized the majority's decision
as "creat[ing] a loophole through which counties like Erie, [in
Arcara] can suppress 'undesirable' protected speech without confronting the protections of the First Amendment."' 130 He feared
that allowing a state the untrammeled license to use a nuisance
statute to suppress speech, without requiring specific and substantial justification, would cause the freedom of speech to lose
its "transcendent value."13
In light of the Supreme Court's prior decisions, the Arcara
Court's refusal to apply the O'Brien standard is well-founded.
The Court's traditional and consistent application of O'Brien has
repeatedly sought a necessary pre-condition-requiring the
existence of conduct with an expressive element. 32 In its review
of the salient facts and circumstances pertinent to the determination of a first amendment issue, the Arcara Court concluded that
124

Id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Cantwell v. Connecticut,

310 U.S. 296 (1940)).

Id.
Id. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)). Justice Blackmun suggested arresting the patrons involved in the illicit activity as an alternative
remedy. Id. The Justice also maintained that the District Attorney failed to demonstrate that a less restrictive remedy would be inadequate to abate the nuisance. Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. (citing New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986); New York v.
Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984)).
131 Id. at 3181 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525 (1958)).
132 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
125
126
127
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the sexual activity sought to be controlled on the bookstore's
premises included no expressive element, distinguishing Arcara
from O'Brien and its progeny. 33 While a bookstore should not be
able to claim special immunity from governmental regulation
34
simply by virtue of its protected first amendment activities,
courts should be cognizant of the fact that, in certain instances,
there may indeed be a legitimate first amendment issue.
Despite its previous recognition that activities of commercial
bookstores are constitutionally protected, 35 the majority in Arcara adamantly refused to acknowledge the presence of a first
amendment issue. 1 36 Instead, the Court focused on the sexual
conduct involved, the non-expressive activity, rather than the
37
sale of books as a means to effectuate approval of the closure.
By its blanket refusal to acknowledge a first amendment issue,
the Court may be viewed as adhering to a policy that commands
ignorance of the first amendment whenever the government has
a legitimate interest in regulating particular conduct or
conditions.
In its broadest terms, the first amendment protects against
"all laws abridging the freedom of speech, not just those directed
at expressive activity.' 138 It cannot be disputed that the closure
order in Arcara would infringe upon the right of the bookstore to
disseminate and its patrons to purchase sexually explicit but nonobscene material. Irrespective of this premise, the Arcara decision allows a state to suppress speech without justification as
long as it does so through uniformly applicable regulations that
are divorced from expressive conduct. 39 Moreover, as the dissent maintained, the Court has consistently struck down statutes
which attempt to regulate nonspeech when the statutes unduly
infringed the speech interest involved. 40 In an attempt to refute
this argument, the majority maintained that the instances where
such statutes have been declared invalid are limited to cases in
which the "nonspeech" activity drawing the sanction was inti133 Arcara, 106
134 Id. at 3177.

S. Ct. at 3176-77.

'35 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (commercial bookstores
have place in facilitation of free expression).
136 See Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3175-78.
137 Id. at 3177. See also supra note 102.
138 Arcara, 106 S.Ct. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also supra note 1 (text
of first amendment).
'39 Arcara, 106 S.Ct. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140 Id.
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mately related to protected expressive conduct. 4 ' The majority,
however, noted that the illegal sexual activity in Arcara was totally
unrelated to the bookselling. 142 In this regard, the majority's
reasoning must fail. Under the Court's theory, a bookstore which
sold materials that induced illicit sexual activity ironically would
be entitled to a greater degree of protection than one whose merchandise 43had no effect on the outward sexual behavior of its
patrons. 1

In examining the legislative intent, it has been recognized
that enforcement of a statute providing for abatement of a public
nuisance is clearly within the police power of the state."' In
abatement of a nuisance, the relief should not exceed that which
is necessary to achieve the legitimate end. 145 Although the government has an interest in eliminating criminal sexual activity,
the means by which it may accomplish this result may be effectuated without considerable infringement on first amendment
freedoms.
Despite the limited duration of criminal conduct alleged in
Arcara, the Supreme Court was anxious to reject the New York
Court of Appeals' rationale that the nuisance could have been
abated through a means less restrictive than closure.' 46 Such refusal may be construed as an attempt to regulate the content of
speech through valid legal measures. While closure might be the
most efficient means, "considerations of this sort do not empower a [state] to abridge the freedom of speech. . . ,,14' The
dissent conceded that closure may have been appropriate, but
148
only after alternative measures were attempted and failed.
While the law should not work to eviscerate community protec141 Id. at 3177 n.3.
142

Id. at 3176-77.

143 See id. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144 See Lane v. City of Mount Vernon, 38 N.Y. 2d 344, 342 N.E.2d 571, 379

N.Y.S. 2d 798 (1976); Lawton v. Steele, 119 N.Y. 226, 23 N.E. 878, 101 N.Y.S. 2d
334 (1894), af'd, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
145 See, e.g.,
People v.Mason, 124 Cal. App. 3d 348, 177 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1981);
Township of Lacey v. Mahr, 119 N.J. Super. 135, 290 A.2d 450 (App. Div. 1972).
146 The allegations which preceded the litigation consisted of statements made by
an undercover police officer regarding illegal activity on the premises of Cloud
Books as a result of a nineteen day investigation in 1982. Arcara, 101 A.D. 2d at
164, 475 N.Y.S. 2d at 175.
147 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
148 Arcara, 106 S.Ct. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court would have
isolated the unprotected activity without adversely impacting free speech. This
could have been accomplished by an application of the New York Penal Laws or a
permanent injunction against illegal conduct.
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tions provided by public nuisance statutes, such statutes should
not be utilized when less drastic measures accomplishing the
identical governmental objective are available. The Arcara majority, however, did not adopt this reasoning and upheld the closure
as permissible under the nuisance statute. 149
The Arcara case may be viewed as an expression of the
Supreme Court's disapproval of stores which peddle "undesirable" materials. Taken alone, the Court's decision is not a momentous one, but when considered in the light of recent
decisions regarding morality and individual rights, 150 the opinion
is emblematic of a renewed moral militancy evident in communities around the country. 15 ' This attitude, however, should not be
permitted to override basic constitutional guarantees. Under a
system of first amendment jurisprudence that claims to protect
the vitality of our system of free expression, courts must not risk
elimination of unlawful activity at the expense of precious lawful
expression.
Marianne Benevenia
149 Id. at 3178.
150 Arcara was decided

during a series of conservative Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (Court upheld school sanction of student who gave speech colored by sexual innuendo);
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986) (Puerto
Rican statute restricting advertising of casino gambling aimed at residents of Puerto Rico could be restricted to protect health, safety, and welfare of citizens); Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (Georgia sodomy statute held not violative
of fundamental rights of homosexuals).
151 See Stengel, Sex Busters, TIME, July 21, 1986, at 12.

